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Abstract
The social and academic reputation of private universities in Japan is generally
far behind the national universities. We argue that heavy subsidy and the low tuition
of national universities determined by the central government are both responsible
for making the production of high academic quality di¢ cult for private universities
in equilibrium. Using several simulations based on a theoretical model of assignment
of heterogeneous students and universities with respect to tuition and educational
quality, we show that the distribution of tuitions and academic quality of private
universities are a⁄ected by the low tuition and heavy subsidy policy of national
university. Using the cross-section data of all universities in Japan, we present
empirical evidence on the determinants of tuition of private universities that support
our theoretical prediction.
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11 Introduction
The social and academic reputations of private universities in Japan are generally far
behind national universities. This is a sharp contrast to the U.S. higher education
market where the most academically successful universities are private, such as Harvard
and Princeton. In Japan, there has not been any ￿Harvard￿among private universities in
the history of higher education in the sense that private universities have never surpassed
national universities in terms of academic quality and social reputation. This paper seeks
to answer why it has been so.
One of the obvious reasons would be the existence of heavy government subsidy
into national universities since their establishment. One student of national universities
receives 3.87 million yen per year as government subsidy, which is 25 times larger than
the average private university student (Ministry of Education 1997). However, since
state universities in the U.S. are also more subsidized than private universities, it is
not immediately clear whether the subsidy story is su¢ cient in explaining a wide gap
between national and private universities in Japan.
In this paper we show that the heavy subsidy into and the low tuition of national
universities set by the central government are both responsible for making the produc-
tion of high academic quality di¢ cult for private universities in equilibrium. In our
theoretical model, the key mechanism through which the quality and tuition of national
universities a⁄ect behavior of private universities is a shift in the assignment of heteroge-
neous students and universities with respect to tuition and education quality. Students
and private universities are assumed to be heterogeneous in ability and endowment, re-
spectively, and the equilibrium distribution of private university quality and tuition is
in￿ uenced by the governmental policy for national universities. Particularly under the
Japanese setting where national universities are heavily subsidized while charging very
low tuition to students, our numerical simulations suggest that private universities are
2forced to charge low tuition and are not able to produce high academic quality due to
the lack of su¢ cient ￿nancial revenue. Then using cross-section data of all universities
in Japan, we present some empirical evidence on the determinants of tuition of private
universities that support our theoretical predictions.
Previous theoretical studies of education market tend to focus on the role of peer
e⁄ects and human capital externality on the prices of college education services and the
sorting of students across schools.1 The most closely related paper to ours is a recent
paper by Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2003, ERS hereafter) that constructs a model of
university market in which all universities, by choosing tuition, admission policy, and
educational expenditure, maximize the quality of education determined by the peer
student quality and the educational expenditure. Like their paper, our theoretical model
is embedded in the literature of assignment (hedonic price) models, developed by Rosen
(1974), Sattinger (1980), and Epple (1987). The main di⁄erence between ERS and ours
is that we ask a di⁄erent question from theirs and we focus on the e⁄ects of (exogenous)
national university policies on the distribution of tuition and education quality among
private universities, while ERS focus on the sorting of students by ability and income
into di⁄erent types of schools with no speci￿c role for public university policy.
Giving independent roles to public university policy in the analysis of higher educa-
tion market is an important step not only for seeking an answer to our speci￿c motivation
but also for providing alternative view of higher education markets for countries where
public universities dominate the market.2 In many countries in Asia and Europe, na-
1Rothschild and White (1995) analyze a competitive model in which consumer￿ s own human capital is
also input for human capital production of others, using higher education as their primary example. Epple
and Romano (1998) construct a computational general equilibrium model of local public school system
with student peer e⁄ects and pro￿t-maximizing private school entry. Their assignment equilibrium
shows that heterogeneous students are sorted into di⁄erent types of schools in which public schools
accommodate students of lowest ability and income.
2Another relatively technical role for public university policy is that it provides the su¢ cient boundary
conditions for solving a di⁄erential equation for tuition function di⁄erentiated by the quality of education.
ERS, in the absence of public university in their model, alternatively introduces an exogenous ￿tuition
cap￿in their model to ensure the calculation of equilibrium tuition and college quality. Which ways are
reasonable should depend on the institutional context.
3tional (or other public) universities tend to dominate in research and education, and
the governmental policy over national universities have sizable impacts on the decision
making and productivity of private universities. Our approach can provide a framework
for analyzing a variety of mixed markets for higher education in various countries.
Our model is also di⁄erent from Epple and Romano (1998) in that, unlike their
model of local public school system in the U.S., there is no explicit link between the
tuition and ￿nancing to national universities. In our model, students and universities
are continuously di⁄erentiated in one dimension - in ability for students and in endow-
ment for universities, respectively. So our equilibrium concept is most closely related to
Sattinger (1980) in the sense that one (atomic) type of university is matched to only
one (atomic) type of student.3 Education quality of each private university is produced
by the pro￿t maximization.4 An equilibrium in the public-private mixed market can be
achieved through the adjustment of tuition and education quality of private universities,
and the degree of queues to the national university. The equilibrium queues not only
serve to equate demand and supply in our assignment model with the policy distortion,
but also explains the widespread ￿ronin￿in Japan - high school graduates who wait for
one year or more to be admitted by their favorite university. Our model also allows the
exit of private universities, and the choice of students on whether or not to go to college.
Our empirical analysis di⁄ers from previous studies of hedonic models of university
tuition5 in that we incorporate the e⁄ect of public intervention in the estimation of the
hedonic tuition function explicitly based on the well-speci￿ed economic model. One of
recent directions of hedonic analyses is to depart from the closed form solution with the
3In ERS, students are continuously distributed in two dimensions of ability and income, thus the
heterogeneity within a school allows them to analyze the role of ￿average￿peer e⁄ects on a particular
student.
4An alternative formulation is to assume that private universities maximize education quality (ERS
2003). We are working to implement this case in our theoretical model and simulation to see which
assumptions better describe the empirical facts of higher education market of Japan and other countries.
5Harford and Marcus (1986) estimated the determinants of levels of tuition at private colleges on their
characteristics, including faculty-student ratios, library size, and the faculty quality, using a cross-section
of 780 U.S. private colleges. In Japan, Yonezawa (1994) and Urata (1998) are the ￿rst who analyzed the
relationship between tuition at private colleges and their characteristics.
4traditional linear-quadratic speci￿cation (Epple 1987) to the identi￿cation of structural
parameters using semiparametric models (Anglin and Gencay 1996; Ekeland, Heckman,
and Nesheim 2002). Although our current numerical solutions give illustrations of special
cases of our model and the full identi￿cation of structural parameters is beyond the
scope of this paper, the ￿ exibility of our numerical methods can be used to supplement
and interpret any parametric ￿semiparametric estimations of hedonic tuition functions,
which we envision as a future direction.
2 Background
The number of 4-year universities in Japan is 669 (99 national, 74 local public,6 and 496
private) universities. The undergraduate enrollments are 2,487,133 (466,341 national,
97,453 local public, and 1,923,339 private).7 Thus the student share of private universi-
ties is 77 %. In terms of the quality of education and research, the social and academic
reputation of private universities in Japan are generally behind national universities. A
recent worldwide university ranking (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Institute of Higher
Education 2003) shows that 5 Japanese national universities are among the top 100
universities in the world while only one private university is ranked among the world
top 250-300 universities. As we will see later, in terms of the selectivity ranking of
universities for entering students, national universities usually occupy the most selective
schools.
On the other hands, in the United States, the most academically successful univer-
sities are private, of which the market share is smaller than that of Japan. In the U.S.,
share of private universities among all full-time student is about 27 %, including gradu-
ate students (Ministry of Education 2001). In the recent survey by U.S. News, 25 out of
6Local public universities are established and ￿nancially subsidized by prefectural or municipal gov-
ernments.
7These are the numbers as of 2001 based on the Basic School Survey (Ministry of Education 2002).
5the top 30 (doctoral) universities are private, among which the top is shared by Harvard
and Princeton.
(Insert Table 1 and Figure 1)
To give a more concrete picture on the di⁄erence in the higher education markets in
Japan and the U.S., Table 1 shows the comparison of key data for private and public
universities of the two countries. Yearly education expenditure for one national/public
university student in Japan is 4.36 million yen, which nearly matches to the amount to
a student expensed by the U.S. private university. The expenditure for Japanese private
university is 1.74 million yen, which is about 40.0 % of Japanese national university and
about 70 % of the U.S. state universities. The proportion of government subsidy to the
total expenditure is 89 % for national universities and 8.9 % for private universities in
Japan. The tuition of national university8 is about 64 % of the average tuition of private
universities in Japan, while in the U.S. the average tuition of state university is about
20 % of private universities. These numbers suggest that in Japan national universities
o⁄er by far better quality education, at least in terms of expenditure, at lower cost
than private universities. In the U.S. such a reversal of the relation between tuition
and expenditure is not observed. This conjecture can be con￿rmed by other measures
of education and research quality. Figure 1 compares four measures of quality between
private and national universities. Consistent with the expenditure data, the per-student
quality of education is much higher in national universities than in private.
(Insert Table 2)
For prospective students, the national universities are higher ranked and more se-
lective at the entrance exam than most private universities. Table 2 shows the average
admission ￿hensachi,￿ which is the relative rating of the mean di¢ culty of entrance
8Regardless of major or institution, the ￿rst year annual tuition for undergraduate programs of the
national university system (including admission and other additional fees) is set to 755,000 yen in 2000.
6exam, and the ratio of the applicants to actual entrants of both private and national
universities for 10 major departments. These ￿gures show that national universities are
generally more selective than private universities.
(Insert Figure 2)
In what way does national university policy a⁄ect the ￿nancial resources of private
universities? Figure 2 shows the trends in average real tuition level of national universi-
ties, private universities, and social science and humanity majors of private universities
which charge the lowest tuition among all majors.9 The graphs show that the tuition
of national universities has rapidly risen since the early 1970￿ s, and that of private uni-
versities has risen remarkably at the similar rate. While the ratio of tuition of national
to that of private has become smaller in recent years, the absolute gap remains large.10
Tuition revenue occupies a major part of the ￿nancial resources of private universities
in Japan. Table 1 shows that the tuition share of the total budget is 62.5 % for private
universities in Japan and 40.7 % for private universities in the U.S. Thus the determi-
nants of tuition level should have a larger impact on educational and research resources
in Japan than in the U.S.
To summarize the facts, the Japanese higher education system has had distinctive
features in contrast to the U.S.; a few highly ranked national universities provide the
high-quality educational services at low tuition. Private universities are behind the
national universities in terms of quality of education and reputation, and their tuition
setting seems to be in￿ uenced by the tuition of national universities.
9Colleges of medicine or dentistry tend to charges the highest tuition among all majors within the
same private university. In our empirical analysis we will focus on social science and humanity majors.
10Without the data for private university tuition before 1975, it is not clear from the ￿gure whether
private universities have followed the national university tuition. Analysis of tuition using data from
long periods remains to be worked.
73 Model of Higher Education Market
In this section, we introduce a simple theoretical model of higher education market
which is built upon the assignment (hedonic price) theory. In this model, we attempt
to describe an assignment of students to universities, and to evaluate the impact of
national education policy (i.e. changes in tuition and quality at national universities)
on the distribution of tuition and education quality at private universities.
3.1 Environment
Consider an economy where there are a continuum of students, a continuum of private
universities, and a single national university.11 Education services are supplied by both
private and national universities. We assume that private universities are heterogeneous
in terms of their initial positive ￿endowments,￿ denoted e; which are short-run ￿xed
resources, such as its historical reputation, library volumes, and building space. Endow-
ment of private universities is distributed on an interval [emin;emax] with density g(e);
and the total number of private university is G =
R emax
emin g(e)de. To produce a given
quality of education services, private universities use their initial endowments and the
educational expenditure out of the tuition revenue. We assume that their objective is to
maximize their pro￿t, that is, they maximize tuition revenues minus educational costs
by choosing education quality and tuition level. Private universities can also choose to
exit from the university market when they cannot achieve the normal pro￿t level at
the optimum.12 We assume that levels of quality and tuition at national universities,
denoted qp and tp respectively, are given exogenously. The capacity of each (atomic)
private university is assumed ￿xed to unity (one student) while the capacity of national
university is Cp, which is also given exogenously.
11In the model we use ￿national university￿to encompass any public universities for which education
quality and tuitions are controlled by central or local governments.
12So precisely speaking, the distribution of endowment is given for ￿private university entrepreneurs,￿
not necessarily for private universities that operate in equilibrium.
8Each student is indexed by a positive ￿ability,￿ denoted a. Ability of students is
distributed on an interval [amin;amax] with a density f(a) and the total number of stu-
dents is F =
R amax
amin f(a)da. The utility of a student depends on the quality of education,
composite consumption goods, and her own ability. Students divide their ￿xed income
y, which is assumed homogeneous across the population, into tuition expenditure and
consumption. There are three distinct modes of educational choice for students; apply-
ing to the national university, attending a private university, and participating labor
market without university education. If they decide to attend private university, they
will choose the quality of private university education, denoted q, taking the equilibrium
tuition schedule, t(q); as given. If they decide to apply the national university, they
expect to consume the education service of quality qp at the cost of tuition tp if they are
admitted. And if they choose not to attend any university, levels of education quality
and tuition expenditure are both assumed to be zero. Each student is assumed to be a
price-taker, and they make their decision to maximize utility given the tuition schedule
of private universities, t(q), a set of national university policy variables, tp and qp; and
the behavior of the other students.
Given the distributions of student and private universities, the optimal choice of qual-
ity by both students and private universities yields the demand and supply of education
service of each quality. A market equilibrium should exhibit a functional relationship,
called ￿hedonic price function￿in the literature, between tuition and quality for private
universities, denoted t(q), so as to equalize demand and supply at each quality level.
3.2 Student Behavior
We assume that the preferences of students with ability a be represented by the quasi-
linear utility function with its sub-utility taking the generalized Cobb-Douglas form,
u(m;q;a) = m+a￿1q￿2; where 0 < ￿1; ￿2 ￿ 1; and m is composite consumption goods
consumed. Thus the marginal utility of education quality positively depends on the
9student￿ s ability.
We ￿rst consider the behavior of students who already have chosen a mode of attend-
ing a private university. The utility maximization problem for the student with ability
a is described as
V (a) ￿ max
m;q m + a￿1q￿2
s:t: m + t(q) = y; (1)
where y is income and t(q) is the hedonic tuition function for private universities. As-
suming the di⁄erentiability of t(q) and the internal solution; the ￿rst-order condition of
the utility maximization with respect to q is given by
t0(q) = ￿2a￿1q￿2￿1; (2)
and the second-order condition is given by
t00(q) > ￿2(￿2 ￿ 1)a￿1q￿2￿2: (3)
The hedonic tuition function, t(q), must satisfy equation (2) and (3). Note that if the
S.O.C. is satis￿ed, the equilibrium quality choice of student, q(a), has the following
property.
dq=da > 0: (4)
This means that students with higher ability choose higher quality of university education
in equilibrium.
We next consider the case when students choose a mode of applying to the national
university. Based on the observation that some high school graduates (￿ronin￿ ) spend a
year or more until passing the entrance examination of their favorite, mostly national,
10universities, we assume that, in equilibrium, some of the applicants may fail to enter the
national university and to try it again next year.13 Let ￿ be the probability of passing
the entrance exam of the national university, and U0; tentatively, be the students￿utility
achieved when they enter the national university. Then the expected utility of students
to be maximized can be written as U0￿ + U0(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + ￿￿￿ = U0￿=(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿) where
￿ is the subjective discount rate. If we simply assume that ￿ can be de￿ned as the
capacity of national university, Cp; divided by the number of total applicants, Ap; the
term p=(1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿) is described as the function of Cp=Ap in equilibrium.14 Therefore
the expected utility of a student with ability a is
￿
1￿(1￿￿)￿ ￿ (y ￿ tp + a￿1q￿2
p ):
When the student chooses not to attend any university, her utility level is y regardless
of her ability.
3.3 Private University Behavior
Each private university chooses the quality of education q so as to maximize the pro￿t
given the equilibrium tuition schedule. We assume that the production function of the
education quality of private universities with the initial endowment e takes the following
Cobb-Douglas form, q = e1￿￿v￿; where 0 < ￿ < 1 and v is the educational expenditure,
measured in dollar per student. Then the cost function can be written as e1￿￿q￿ where
￿ ￿ 1=￿ and ￿ > 1. Thus, to achieve a given level of quality, the current educational
cost is lower with a higher level of endowment. The pro￿t maximization problem of
private universities is written as
￿(e) ￿ max
q t(q) ￿ e1￿￿q￿: (5)
13The dynamics is introduced only to produce the expected return of applying the national university.
A fully dynamic model with a sequential decision-making of students regarding university mode choice
would be an interesting future extension.
14The probability of passing the exam may realistically depend on the student￿ s ability. Doing so
would unnecessarily complicate the following analysis with no major addition in the implications on the
private university markets.
11The ￿rst-order condition of this maximization problem with respect to q is given as
t0(q) = ￿e1￿￿q￿￿1; (6)
and the second-order condition is given as
t00(q) < ￿(￿ ￿ 1)e1￿￿q￿￿2: (7)
Note that if the S.O.C. is satis￿ed, the supply of education quality by private universities,
q(e), has the following property:
dq=de > 0: (8)
As is the student case, this property means that more endowed universities choose to
produce higher quality of university education in equilibrium. We also assume that the
reservation pro￿t level is zero for all universities.
3.4 Calculation of Sorting Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to equilibria where, like the higher education in Japan, the
equilibrium assignment of students exhibit sorting by ability, and the national university
has higher quality and attracts students with higher ability than any private universities.
We show conditions with which such an equilibrium exists and students are divided into
at most three groups by two threshold ability levels; the highest ability group who chooses
the national university, the middle ability group who chooses private universities, and
the lowest ability group who chooses no higher education. Let us denote the lower
and upper boundary of students￿ability who attend a private university by ￿ a and ^ a;
respectively. Then, students with a 2 [amin;￿ a] will enter labor market without attending
any university, a 2 [￿ a;^ a] will attend private universities, and a 2 [^ a;amax] will choose
the national university in equilibrium. We consider cases in which amin ￿ ￿ a < ^ a < amax
12holds, that is there are always some students who attend national and private university,
but students who enter labor market without university education do not always exist
in equilibrium.
3.4.1 Matching between Students and Private Universities
We ￿rst consider the matching of private universities and students who are willing to
attend them, given the upper and lower boundaries of ability, ￿ a and ^ a: For the ease
of computation and presentation of equilibria, we assume that the ability of students
and endowments of universities are both uniformly distributed with density equal to 1.
Then the total demand for private universities by students with ability higher than a is
given by
R ^ a
a f(a)da = ^ a ￿ a: Similarly, for each e, total supply of education by private
universities with endowment higher than e is given by
R emax
e g(e)de = emax ￿ e: Market
clearing requires the above two expressions are equated for any private student-university
matched pair, so we need
^ a ￿ a = emax ￿ e; for any matched pair (a;e), ￿ a ￿ a ￿ ^ a: (9)
Equalizing the F.O.C.s for students and private universities, equations (2) and (6), and






a￿1(a + emax ￿ ^ a)￿￿1
￿1=(￿￿￿2)
: (10)
The optimal quality choice by private universities, q(e), is obtained in the similar manner.
Using these conditions, we next derive the hedonic tuition function. From the F.O.C.





￿2a(q)￿1q￿2￿1dq + C; (11)
13where C is the constant of integration, and a(q) is the inverse function of q(a). Since
there is no general simple form for a(q) that can be derived from equation (10), we
change the variable of equation (11) using equation (10) to get the following alternative






da + C (12)
= ￿(a;^ a) ￿ ￿(￿ a;^ a) + C;
where ￿(a;^ a) is the in￿nite integral of ￿2a￿1q(a)￿2￿1(@q=@a), to which we emphasize its
dependence on ^ a, and ￿ a;^ a; and C are unknown parameters to be determined.
3.4.2 Consistency Conditions for Equilibrium
To complete the computation of the equilibrium hedonic tuition function, t(a); we add
the following consistency conditions to determine the upper and lower boundary of abil-
ity of private university students, ^ a and ￿ a, and the constant of integration, C. First,
students who choose to apply the national university in equilibrium must achieve at least
as high utility level as what they would achieve by attending the most preferred private
university. Second, students who choose to attend a private university in equilibrium
must achieve at least as high utility level as what they would achieve by attending the
national university. Third, students attending private university in equilibrium at least
achieve their reservation utility level (i.e. utility level when they choose no university
education). Finally, in order for private universities to participate in the market, they
must earn positive pro￿t in equilibrium. These conditions make students￿decision mak-
ing problem about their qualitative choice ￿choose no education, private university or
national university ￿be globally optimal. Technically, these criteria generate the neces-
sary boundary conditions to determine unknown parameters in equation (12), C, ￿ a, and
^ a.
14First, we consider conditions derived from students￿optimal choice between private
and national university education. Given the equilibrium positive sorting of students
into the three groups, (1) for a student with a 2 [^ a;amax] , the national university must
be preferred to any private universities, (2) for a student with a 2 [￿ a;^ a], attending her
(optimal) private university must be preferred to the national university under the given
tuition schedule.
Given the sorting, the equilibrium number of applicants for the national university,
Ap, is equal to amax ￿ ^ a, and the probability to pass the national university exam, ￿; is
de￿ned as ￿ = Cp=(amax ￿ ^ a), where Cp is the given capacity of the national university.
Since the expected utility of a student applying the national university with ability a
is given by p(^ a)(y ￿ tp + a￿1q￿2
p ), where p(^ a) = ￿=(1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿), we need the following
boundary conditions in equilibrium.
Upper Boundary Conditions:
Su¢ cient conditions for the positive sorting of students by ability to national and
private universities in the assignment equilibrium are
UB1. For student with ability ^ a < amax, attending the top private is equivalent to
applying the national university. Namely,
y ￿ t(q(^ a)) + ^ a￿1q(^ a)￿2 = p(^ a)(y ￿ tp + ^ a￿1q￿2
p ): (13)
UB2. q(^ a)￿2 < p(^ a)q￿2
p . (National university has su¢ ciently high quality relative to top
private university.)
Leaving the formal proofs in the Appendix, here we provide an interpretation for these
conditions. The ￿rst condition, UB1, ensures the existence of the national university in
equilibrium. Because levels of utility of attending private and national university are
both continuous functions with respect to student￿ s ability, the (expected) utility level
15of attending (top) private university must be equal to that of applying to the national
university at the upper boundary of private university attendants. Otherwise some
students would be better o⁄ by changing their choice (from private to national, or vice
versa).
The second condition, UB2, ensures the positive sorting of students by ability to
national and private universities, that is, students in the highest ability group optimally
choose to apply the national university and those in the middle ability group choose to
enter private universities. Since the probability to pass the national university￿ s exam is
identical for any students (regardless of their ability),15 the term p(^ a)q￿2
p can be viewed
as the discounted (or expected) quality obtained by applying the national university.
UB2 says that the level of national university quality, qp, must be su¢ ciently high, given
p(^ a) and the quality of the top private university, q(^ a). The single crossing property of
student￿ s utility function (or the complementarity between ability and education quality)
implies that student￿ s valuation for a given quality of education positively depends on
her ability. When the discounted quality of the national university education is higher
than the quality of the top private university, the complementarity in utility function
immediately implies a positive sorting of students by ability. But if q(^ a)￿2 > p(^ a)q￿2
p ,
students with a < ^ a may have a greater valuation for the national university than those
with a > ^ a, and positive sorting will not take place in equilibrium.
We next examine the lower boundary conditions. First, for students, two situations
may occur in equilibrium:16 (1) some students choose not to enter any universities,
and (2) all students choose to attend some university. Let V (a) denote the indirect
utility function for student with ability a. Then the former case can be expressed by
the condition V (￿ a) = y17. The latter case can be written by the condition ￿ a = amin.
Next, for private universities, two situations may also occur in equilibrium: (1) some
15Alternatively we could more realistically allow the probability of passing the national university to
depend on ability. Clearly doing so would not change the single-crossing property described here.
16We exclude the third trivial case where all students choose not to attend any university.
17Then it can be shown that V (a) < y for 8a < ￿ a.
16(potential) private universities choose not to participate in the market, and (2) all private
universities participate in the market. Let ￿ e denote the lowest level of endowment to
participate the market, and ￿(e) denote the equilibrium pro￿t as the function of e. Then
the former case can be expressed by ￿(￿ e) = 018. The latter case can be written by the
condition ￿ e = emin Now we can classify the four patterns of lower boundary conditions
for an equilibrium, depending on market environment.
Lower Boundary Conditions:
Su¢ cient conditions for the positive sorting of students by ability to private universi-
ties and no university education in the assignment equilibrium take one of the following
4 forms:
LB1. ￿ a = amin and ￿ e = emin with V (￿ a) > y and ￿(￿ e) > 0. In this case all students go
to some university and all private universities remain in the market.
LB2. ￿ a > amin and ￿ e = emin with V (￿ a) = y and ￿(￿ e) > 0. In this case some students
do not go to any university and all private universities remain in the market.
LB3. ￿ a = amin and ￿ e > emin with V (￿ a) > y and ￿(￿ e) = 0. In this case all students go
to some university and some private universities exit the market.
LB4. ￿ a > amin and ￿ e > emin with V (￿ a) = y and ￿(￿ e) = 0. In this case some students
do not go to any university and some private universities exit the market.
With UB1, UB2, and one of the conditions LB1-4, we can determine the equilibrium
values of upper and lower boundary of student￿ s ability of private universities, and the
hedonic tuition function, t(a), from equation (12). The tuition function can be written
in terms of endowment, denoted t(e), using the market clearing condition (equation (9)).
18Then it can be shown that ￿(e) < 0 for 8e < ￿ e.
174 Numerical Examples of Equilibrium Tuition and Educa-
tion Quality
This section presents some numerical examples to examine the e⁄ect of changes in na-
tional education policy (tp, qp, and Cp) on levels of tuition and quality at private uni-
versities. We focus on the case where equation (12) can be analytically solved under
the LB3 of the lower boundary conditions.19 In this case, all students will attend some
university (private or national), but some private universities will exit from the higher
education market in equilibrium. The full speci￿cation of the parameter values and
details of the computation are described in the Appendix.20
Our baseline parameter values for the national university are that its capacity, Cp, is
5 (about 10% of the total capacity of higher education), the tuition, tp, is 1000, and the
education quality, qp, is 700; respectively. Then, the tuition at the top private university
(with e = emax) will become 1962:8, twice as large as that of national university, and
its quality will be 636:74, almost as same as that of national university, in equilibrium.
Students with their ability above 63:5 (about 28% of total population) will apply the
national university, and the probability to pass the exam will be about 30% in equilib-
rium. Private universities with their initial endowment below 46:5 will exit from the
higher education market.
We next examine the e⁄ect of national university policies on the behavior of private
universities. We consider the following three types of policy changes from the baseline
case separately, holding the other conditions constant; (1) 30% increase in qp, (2) 100%
increase in tp, and (3) 50% increase in Cp. Figure 3 and 4 show the e⁄ects of alternative
policies on the equilibrium tuition and the equilibrium education quality of private uni-
versities on the endowment domain, respectively. Since the policy change should shift
19The other cases are not di¢ cult to calculate, and will be added shortly.
20In the current version, parameter values are chosen for an ease of computation of equation (12)
and the intuitiveness of the results. We are working to assess the sensitivity of the results with various
parameter values with better empirical support.
18an equilibrium assignment of students and universities, it is also important to see the
changes in tuition and education quality on the ability domain, that is from students￿
point of view. Those are presented in Figure 5 and 6. 21
(Insert Figure 3)
Figure 3(a) shows the e⁄ect of quality improvement of national university on the
private university tuition function. Two equilibrium tuition functions are plotted on
the private university endowment, e 2 [emin;emax]. The solid curve indicates the tuition
function for the base-line case (qp = 700), and the broken curve indicates the tuition
function for the case where qp is increased by 30% from the base-line value (qp = 910). It
is found that the levels of tuition at any private universities fall with an improvement of
the quality at the national university. The economic interpretation of this result is fairly
straightforward. An increase in qp will have two opposing e⁄ects on the students decision
making. First, since, with a higher quality, the national university becomes more attrac-
tive for potential applicants, some students, who previously attend a private university,
will shift to applying the national university. But at the same time, an increase in the
number of applicants makes it di¢ cult for them to be admitted. Although the lower
probability to pass the exam tends to dump the shift of students from private to national
universities, more students apply the national university than before in equilibrium. As
a result, this will tighten the private university market, and private universities will be
forced to undercut their tuition in order to keep up with competition with high-quality
national university. At the same time, some private universities exit from the higher
education market as qp increases. Private universities with their endowment level below
53:5 (the baseline case was below 46:5) will exit from the higher education market in
under alternative education policy.
A rise in tuition at the national university has completely an opposite e⁄ect. Figure
21See the Appendix for detail of derivation. We can also plot the utility level of students and the pro￿t
of private universities in equilibrium. Those ￿gures can be sent upon request.
193(b) shows that an increase in tp will increase the tuition levels at all private universities.
The interpretation is essentially the same as the above. Since an increase in tp will lower
the utility level of all students who attend the national university, this leads to a shift
of some students from national to private universities, and therefore private universities
can now charge higher tuition than before. The e⁄ect of the national university capacity
is shown in Figure 3(c). Since the applicants for the national university are more likely
to be admitted when Cp is larger, some students will shift from private to national
university. This forces private universities to charge lower tuition in equilibrium, as
suggested in the ￿gure.
(Insert Figure 4)
The national education policies also a⁄ect the academic quality of private universities.
Figure 4 (a) shows the e⁄ect of quality improvement at the national university on levels
of quality produced by private universities. There are two equilibrium quality functions
of private universities plotted on endowment level. The solid curve indicates the quality
function for the base-line case (qp = 700), and the broken curve indicates the quality
function for the case where qp is increased by 30% from the base-line value (qp = 910).
It is found that the levels of academic quality at private universities uniformly decline
as qp rises. The interpretation is almost parallel to that of the tuition case. Since an
increase in qp leads to a shift of students from private to national university, the student
ability matched to each private university declines. This makes private universities to
produce lower quality education and charge lower tuition, since the marginal willingness
to pay of matched students for given private university also declines. Figure 4 (b) and
4 (c) also present the e⁄ect of changes in tp and Cp, respectively, on the equilibrium
quality of private universities. Simulation results show that levels of quality produced
by private universities are positively related to an increase in tp, and negatively related
to an increase in Cp. The interpretations of these results can be given in the similar
20manner as above, and are omitted here.
(Insert Figure 5 and 6)
We can also see the above discussion from the student￿ s point of view. Figure 5 shows
the e⁄ect of national education policies on the tuition charged for each student on the
ability domain;[amin;amax]. It is found that changes in education policies which favor
the national university will always lead to the higher tuition for each student. These
results may seem counterintuitive because the tuition of each private university fall at
the same time as seen in Figure 3. Recall that changes in the national university policy
reassign students to universities, in our case shifting students at the private universities
to national university. After the change of education policy, students of a given ability
who remain in the private sector will be matched to a higher-endowed private university
than before, necessarily at a slightly higher tuition. Being matched with less able stu-
dents, private universities at a given endowment choose to charge less tuition with lower
education quality in a new equilibrium, as shown in Figure 3 and 4. Finally, changes
in the optimal education quality chosen by each student are shown in Figure 6. The
results show that the education policies which favor the national university will improve
the quality of education consumed by each student of a given ability level, since they are
matched to more endowed universities than before. This result is consistent with our
discussions.
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present some empirical evidences on the determinants of tuition of
private universities using the cross-section data of Japanese private universities.
Our current empirical analyses rely on the idea that we can reasonably assume pre-
fectural university markets are geographically separated to entering students. Let each
21prefecture indexed by k; each private university indexed by j, and dk represent the prefec-
tural level quality of national universities.22 Then our tests of the theoretical predictions
are generally written by the following two equations:
log(tuitionjk) = ￿1 + ￿1 ￿ dk + ￿1 ￿ ajk + ￿1 ￿ x1k + "1jk; (14a)
log(tuitionjk) = ￿2 + ￿2 ￿ dk + ￿2 ￿ ejk + ￿2 ￿ x2k + "2jk; (14b)
where ajk is the average ability of students in university j in prefecture k, ejk is the
endowment of university j in prefecture k, xik (i = 1;2) is the variables that proxy
the distributions of endowments of private universities in prefecture k; ai; ￿i; ￿i, and
￿i are the coe¢ cients, and "ijk is random errors. Thus we conduct the estimation of
hedonic tuition function of Japanese private universities from demand and supply sides,
separately.23 Equation (14a) is an empirical counterpart of the tuition function t(a)
while equation (14b) is an empirical counterpart of t(e) in our theoretical model.
This cross-section data of Japanese private universities are mainly compiled for aca-
demic year 2000-2001 from the following two sources. Data on entrance ￿hensachi,￿the
mean standardized nation-wide test scores of entrants, was provided by Sundai Yobiko
based on its nation-wide simulation test. It covers all Japanese four-year colleges. Other
university characteristics are collected from Nihon no Daigaku (Toyo Keizai, 2001), a
major college guide book containing information on the universities available to students.
This book provides us with various characteristics of Japanese universities, including the
location of university, tuition and other fees, number of enrollments, library volume, fac-
ulty size, areas of campus and building, etc. In addition to these main sources, the data
22Since levels of tuition at national university are set equal regardless of majors or regions, we cannot
see the e⁄ect of changes in national university tuition here. All prefectures have at least one national
university.
23By doing this, we currently assume that the distribution of student ability is invariant among prefec-
tures. Ideally panel data of universities across prefectures over years would identify the e⁄ects of ability
distribution under less restrictive assumption that the distribution is heterogeneous across prefectures
but time-invariant. We are in the process to prepare such panel data.
22on the ￿nancial subsidy to private educational institution is collected from the webpage
of the Promotion and Mutual Aid Corporation for Private Schools of Japan24. Data on
prefecture-level characteristics of higher education market, such as number of entrants
for private and national universities located at the same prefecture of their high school,
are collected from the Basic School Survey (Ministry of Education, 2001).
The data used in our analysis is restricted to samples of ￿ve major ￿arts￿depart-
ments, economics, commerce, business, law, and literature, of all the private universities
in Japan. There are two reasons for this sample restriction. First, because Japanese
students tend to decide their college major at their early days in high school, we believe
that the market structures may di⁄er between majors of arts and science. Second, some
of the important endowment measures at science courses, such as experimental facilities
or lab wares, are not available for us. Our initial sample size is 351. However, due to
missing observations, sample size in each estimation is slightly below this.
All the variables for private universities are constructed as the department (i.e., un-
dergraduate major) level average since annual tuition is usually set at department level.
Therefore, other variables that may vary within a department (mainly due to the di⁄er-
ences in multiple admission processes), such as hensachi, are averaged to make a single
observation at department level. The variable ￿log(tuition),￿the dependent variable of
our estimations, stands for the natural logarithm of annual tuition fee including other
required fees. Corresponding to the theoretical model, the ￿hensachi￿variable can be
viewed as the mean ability of students enrolled in each university, ajk: For data on
endowment of private universities, we have following variables; ￿faculty-student ratio,￿
￿per-student area of campus,￿￿per-student area of school building,￿and ￿per-student
library volume￿of each university. They are assumed to collectively measure ejk. The
variable ￿￿nancial subsidy￿stands for the per-student amount of the ￿nancial subsidy
to private education institution.
24http://www.shigaku.go.jp/s_home.htm
23Strictly speaking, we do not directly observe the true education quality of any uni-
versity, national or private. However, using information on endowments of national
universities, we construct the new variables that are thought to proxy the prefecture-
level average quality of national universities in prefecture k, dk; ￿per-student areas of
campus￿ and ￿school building￿ , and ￿per-student faculty￿ and ￿library size￿ . Since
those variables are highly correlated with each other, we do not include them at the
same time in the regression. So we estimate the e⁄ect of these variables separately.
In addition to these variables, we also use several control variables in our analysis.
￿Female student ratio￿ is used to control the demographic characteristic of entrants.
￿Number of subjects,￿that is the number of subjects asked in the entrance exam, is used
to capture the (implicit) preparation costs for the students.25 We also include several
variables that are expected to proxy prefecture-level characteristics of local university
market, xik. They are the ￿share of entrants to private university who graduated high
schools in the same prefecture￿ and the ￿share of entrants to the national university
who graduated high school in the same prefecture as the university￿in order to control
for any e⁄ects of student migration across prefectures upon entering university26. We
also include the ￿share of private university￿ in each prefecture (in terms of number
of entrants). We also use ￿ve dummies for the departments of business, economics,
commerce, law, and literature. We use the actual number of entrants as the frequency
weight because the ideal unit of observation for this analysis is student.27
The de￿nitions and descriptive statistics of variables are summarized in Table 3.
In Table 4, we present the estimation results of equation (14a), regressing log(tuition)
on the entrance ￿hensachi￿and several prefectural-level characteristics including various
25Majority of ￿arts￿ major departments of private universities ask 2 subjects such as English and
Japanese, English and Short essay, for 90 minutes each.
26For example, among 100 high school graduates in a given prefecture, say, 20 students go to national
universities and 30 go to private universities, and among them, 5 out of 20 national university attendants
and 10 out of 30 private university attendants migrate out of the prefecture upon entrance. In this case,
the ￿rst index is 0.75 and the second index is 0.67.
27Our coe¢ cient estimates do not essentially change without the weights, but statistical signi￿cance
are much lowered.
24proxy measures of the average quality of the national universities, such as faculty/student
ratio, areas of campus and building, and library volume. Our numerical simulations
predict that the education policies that favor the national university will increase the
levels of tuition charged for each students. The results show that all of these variables
have signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on the tuition. These results are consistent with our
theoretical prediction that higher quality at the national university leads to a rise in
tuition for each student.
Table 5 presents the estimation results of equation (14b), regressing log(tuition) on
the endowment variables of private universities while excluding the ￿hensachi￿variable.
It is found that the prefecture averages of faculty/student ratio, per-student area of
school building, and library volume of national university all have negative e⁄ects on the
tuition of private universities at least 10% signi￿cance level. This is consistent with our
theoretical predictions that the market pressure due to the quality improvement at the
national university leads to a fall in tuition at private universities. It is also found that
almost all endowment measures for private university, except for the per-student area
of campus, are signi￿cantly and positively related to levels of tuition charged by private
universities. This result implies that more endowed private university tends to charge
higher tuition and thus to produce higher quality education in equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we ask why private universities in Japan may not be able to produce
high academic quality under the distortion made by the national university policy. We
show, both in numerical examples and in empirical analyses, that the quality and tuition
of national university do a⁄ect the distribution of tuition of private universities. The
estimation results show, consistent with our theoretical predictions, that in prefectures
where national universities have relatively high quality, the tuition of private universities
25tend to be lower than average when controlling for the endowments of private universities,
while the tuition tends to be higher when controlling for the average ability of entering
students. Given the large share of tuition revenue in the budget of private universities as
shown in Table 1, our theoretical and empirical results both point to the role of national
university policies in determining the ￿nancial constraint on the private universities for
improving their academic quality, again as shown in Table 1.
Our theoretical and empirical analyses are constrained by the limitations of the data,
particularly of individual students and on the quality of education at individual univer-
sity level. We hope to expand our research by including more of such data. We are
also working to implement more sophisticated semiparametric estimations of our hedo-
nic tuition function to recover more information on the behavior of individual students
and universities. We believe that our simulation results will help interpreting and un-
derstanding estimation results with more ￿ exibility than what we presented here.
26Appendix
A Proof of Upper Boundary Conditions
Upper Boundary Condition:
Su¢ cient conditions for the positive sorting of students by ability to national and
private universities in assignment equilibrium are
UB1. At the upper boundary of student￿ s ability, ^ a < amax,
y ￿ t(q(^ a)) + ^ a￿1q(^ a)￿2 = p(^ a)(y ￿ tp + ^ a￿1q￿2
p ) (A1)
must be satis￿ed in equilibrium. (For student with ability ^ a, attending the top
private is indi⁄erent to applying the national university.)
UB2. q(^ a)￿2 < p(^ a)q￿2
p . (national university has su¢ ciently high quality relative to
private.)
Proof:
When the ￿rst and second order conditions are satis￿ed both for students and private
universities, among those who choose private universities, students with higher ability
always choose a university of higher quality in equilibrium. This is veri￿ed by the single-
crossing property of indi⁄erence curves of students on q and t.
Under UB1, the assignment is in equilibrium if and only if (a) those with a > ^ a
would be strictly better o⁄ by choosing the national university rather than choosing the
top private university and (b) those with a < ^ a would be strictly better o⁄ by choosing
their optimal private university rather than the national university.
(a) For those with a > ^ a, U(national) ￿ U(top private) = p(^ a)(y ￿ tp + a￿1q￿2
p ) ￿
(y ￿ t(^ a) + ^ a￿1q(^ a)￿2) = (p(^ a)q￿2
p ￿ q(^ a)￿2)(a￿1 ￿ ^ a￿1) using equation (13). Therefore,
applying the national university is strictly preferred if and only if (q(^ a)￿2 < p(^ a)q￿2
p ):
27(b) Similarly for those with a < ^ a; under q(^ a)￿2 < p(^ a)q￿2
p ; U(national) ￿ U(top
private) = (p(^ a)q￿2
p ￿ q(^ a)￿2)(a￿1 ￿ ^ a￿1) < 0: Since for those with a < ^ a; choosing less
than top private university is the best choice among all the private universities, they will
not choose the national university.
B Details of Numerical Examples
We ￿rst describe the derivation of t(a) in more detail, and show cases for which equation
(12) is analytically solvable.






q(a)[￿1a￿1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(a + emax ￿ ^ a)￿1]:










￿￿￿2 (a￿emax +^ a)
￿2(￿￿1)
￿￿￿2 [￿1a￿1 +(￿ ￿1)(a+emax ￿^ a)￿1] (A2)
It is known that the analytical expression of the in￿nite integral of the above expression
can be obtained if either ￿2￿=(￿ ￿ ￿2), ￿2(￿ ￿ 1)=(￿ ￿ ￿2), or ￿2￿=(￿ ￿ ￿2) + ￿2(￿ ￿
1)=(￿ ￿ ￿2) is an integer.
Since ￿2(￿ ￿ 1)=(￿ ￿ ￿2) = 1 if ￿2 = 1, we set ￿2 = 1 in our example. A full spec-
i￿cation of parameter values are given as follows. Potential students are distributed on
[amin;amax] = [20;80], and private universities are distributed on [emin;emax] = [10;90].
Parameters for utility function, ￿1 and ￿2, are set 1=3 and 1, respectively. A parameter
for cost function, ￿, is set to be 3=2. Subjective discount rate, ￿, is set to be 0:95.
Income of each student, y, is assumed 10000. Finally, the baseline values for the key
parameters for our analysis, the quality, tuition, and capacity of national university is
set to be qp = 700, tp = 1000, and Cp = 5, respectively.
28To determine the values for ^ a, ￿ a, and C of the hedonic tuition function under UB1,
UB2, and LB3 numerically, we impose ￿ a = amin, ￿(emin) = 0; and y ￿ t(q(^ a)) +
^ a￿1q(^ a)￿2 = p(^ a)(y￿tp+^ a￿1q￿2
p ). Given the equilibrium values of ^ a, ￿ a, and C, substitut-
ing these values into the solution of equation (12) yields the numerical hedonic tuition
function, t(a). After solving t(a), we can change the variable from a to e by using the
market clearing condition (equation (9)) to obtain t(e). Also, once we determine the
equilibrium value for ^ a, the equilibrium quality function, q(a) and q(e), can be easily
calculated.
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(a) Effect of National University Quality
(b) Effect of National University Tuition
(c) Effect of National University Capacity
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Table 3: Effect of National University Policy on the Private University Tuition
              (plotted on endowment domain)
Note: qp is quality of national university. tp is tuition of national university.
          Cp is capacity of national university.
























(a) Effect of National University Quality
(b) Effect of National University Tuition
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Table 4: Effect of National University Policy on the Private University Quality
              (plotted on endowment domain)
Note: qp is quality of national university. tp is tuition of national university.
          Cp is capacity of national university.


















(a) Effect of National University Quality
(b) Effect of National University Tuition
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Table 5: Effect of National University Policy on the Private University Tuition
              (plotted on ability domain)
Note: qp is quality of national university. tp is tuition of national university.
          Cp is capacity of national university.
























(a) Effect of National University Quality
(b) Effect of National University Tuition
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      university (qp=910)
Table 6: Effect of National University Policy on the Private University Quality
              (plotted on ability domain)
Note: qp is quality of national university. tp is tuition of national university.
          Cp is capacity of national university.
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